Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Barbara B. Uzelac v. Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Charles M. Bennett; Blackburn and Stoll; Counsel for the Appelant .
Margaret Olson; Counsel for Appellees; Counsel for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Uzelac v. Uzelac, No. 20060858 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6825

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of the Estate of
LOUIS J. UZELAC
Deceased.

Appellate Case No. 20060858-CA
Trial Court Case No. 993901690
Judge Leon A. Dever

BARBARA B. UZELAC,
Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH G. UZELAC, JR., as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Louis J. Uzelac,

SUSAN BROOKE MAGERAS and
ALLYSON D. UZELAC,
Intervenors and
Cross Appellants.

(AMENDED) BRIEF OF INTERVENORS/CROSS APPELLANTS

Margaret H. Olson (6296)
Of Counsel
HOBBS 8c OLSON, L.C.
466 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 519-2555
Facsimile: (801) 519-2 999

Charles M. Bennett (A0283)
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
257 West 200 South, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2142
Telephone: (801) 521-7900
Facsimile: (801) 521-3 52 6

Counsel for Intervenors/
Cross Appellants
Susan Brooke Mageras and
Allyson D. Uzelac

Counsel for Appellant,
Barbara B. Uzelac
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE CCM 'RT-

APR 2 ? 200?

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of the Estate of
LOUIS J. UZELAC
Deceased.

Appellate Case No. 20060858-CA
Trial Court Case No. 993901690
Judge Leon A. Dever

BARBARA B. UZELAC,
Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH G. UZELAC, JR., as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Louis J. Uzelac,

SUSAN BROOKE MAGERAS and
ALLYSON D. UZELAC,
Intervenors and
Cross Appellants.

(AMENDED) BRIEF OF INTERVENORS/CROSS APPELLANTS

Margaret H. Olson (6296)
Of Counsel
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.
466 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 519-2555
Facsimile: (801) 519-2999

Charles M. Bennett (A0283)
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
257 West 200 South, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2142
Telephone: (801) 521-7900
Facsimile: (801) 521-352 6

Counsel for Intervenors/
Cross Appellants
Susan Brooke Mageras and
Allyson D. Uzelac

Counsel for Appellant,
Barbara B. Uzelac

LIST OF PARTIES

1.

The Estate of Louis J. Uzelac.

Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr. is

the successor personal representative of the Estate and,
since the Estate is insolvent and cannot afford counsel to
defend Barbara's appeal, has chosen not to participate in
these proceedings.

2.

Barbara B. Uzelac, second wife and surviving spouse of
Louis J. Uzelac.

Barbara is the Plaintiff below and

Appellant herein.

3.

Allyson D. Uzelac and S. Brooke Mageras, daughters of Louis
J. Uzelac and Ruth Uzelac.

Allyson and Brooke are

Intervenors below and Cross-Appellants here.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to Utah Code 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2) (j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue #1:

Under Louis7 Will, what are the proper

classifications of the parties' devises?

Were Louis' daughters

general devisees or residuary beneficiaries?

Was the devise to

Barbara a general devise chargeable to specific property or a
"general pecuniary devise?"
Standard of Review:

The determination of these categories

of devises is a mixed question of fact and law.

"A mixed

question involves 'the application of law to fact or, stated
more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts
comes within the reach of a given rule of law.'"
Hosps.,

Inc.,

2003 UT 51, 1(57, 82 P. 3d 1076.

Jensen

v. IHC

If a case involves

a mixed question of fact and law, the appellate court affords
some measure of discretion to the trial court's application of
law to a given fact situation.
937-38 (Utah 1994); see also
1244 (Utah 1998) .

State

Jeffs

v.

v. Pena,
Stubbs,

869 P.2d 932,
970 P.2d 1234,

"The measure of discretion afforded varies,

however, according to the issue being reviewed."
Hansen,

2002 UT 125, 1(25, 63 P.3d 650.

1

State

v.

Preservation of Issue in Court Below:

On remand, the trial

court considered the proper classification of devises.

Barbara

briefed the issue at R.1631 and the trial court ruled at R.1754,
p. 5, para. 14 and fn.l.
Issue #2:

Did the trial court calculate the proper amount

of money "acquired by the parties during the marriage and held
at death?"
Standard of Review:

A district court's findings of fact

are reviewed for clear error.

Chen v.

Stewart,

2005 UT 68, 123

P.3d 416.
Preservation of Issue in Court Below:

This issue was

briefed on remand at R.1585-1587 and the trial court ruled at
1751-1754.
Issue #3:

Does the status of the homestead (deeded to

Brooke and Allyson subject to Barbara's life estate) affect
Barbara's claims for relief?
Standard of Review:

A determination of the legal

characteristics of a life estate is a question of law which is
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of
the trial court.

Peterson

v.

Delta

Air

Lines,

Inc.,

2002 UT App

56, 42 P.3d 1253.
Preservation of Issue in Court Below:

On remand, Barbara

argued the trial court should at once order the homestead
2

returned and sold and that she was entitled to retain her life
estate interest.

R.1638.

The trial court denied the relief at

R.1755 and 1757.
Issue #4:

Was Barbara's request on remand for the trial

court to order Brooke and Allyson to return the homestead
property to the Estate time barred by Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-412
and 75-3-1004 and 1006?
Standard of Review:

Interpretation of statutes presents a

question of law reviewed for correctness.

In re VKS, 2003 UT

App 13, 63 P.3d 1284.
Preservation of Issue in Court Below:

The statute of

limitations argument was raised on remand at R.1583-1584 and the
trial court ruled at R.1754-1755.
Issue #5:

What was the testator's overall purpose?

Standard of Review:

A district court's findings of fact

are reviewed for clear error.

Chen v. Stewart,

2005 UT 68, 123

P.3d 416.
Preservation of Issue in Court Below:

This issue was

preserved for appeal at R.1585.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201 General Definitions.
(13) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of
a decedent from his personal representative other than as a
creditor or purchaser.
3

(18) "Formal proceedings" means proceedings conducted before a
judge with notice to interested persons.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412. Formal testacy proceedings -- Effect
of order -- Vacation.
(1) Subject to appeal and subject to vacation as provided
in this section and in Section 75-3-413, a formal testacy order
under this part, including an order that the decedent left no
valid will and determining heirs, is final as to all persons
with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate that
the court considered or might have considered incident to its
rendition relevant to the question of whether the decedent left
a valid will, and to the determination of heirs, except that:
(a) The court shall entertain a petition for modification
or vacation of its order and probate of another will of the
decedent if it is shown that the proponents of the later-offered
will were unaware of its existence at the time of the earlier
proceeding or were unaware of the earlier proceeding and were
given no notice of it, except by publication.
(b) If intestacy of all or part of the estate has been
ordered, the determination of heirs of the decedent may be
reconsidered if it is shown that one or more persons were
omitted from the determination and it is also shown that the
persons were unaware of their relationship to the decedent, were
unaware of his death, or were given no notice of any proceeding
concerning his estate, except by publication.
(c) The order originally rendered in the testacy proceeding
may be modified or vacated, if appropriate under the
circumstances, by the order of probate of the later-offered will
or the order redetermining heirs.
(d) The finding of the fact of death is conclusive as to
the alleged decedent only if notice of the hearing on the
petition in the formal testacy proceeding was sent by registered
or certified mail addressed to the alleged decedent at his last
known address and the court finds that a search under Subsection
75-3-403(2) was made.
(2)
sent and
hands of
remedies

If the alleged decedent is not dead, even if notice was
search was made, he may recover estate assets in the
the personal representative. In addition to any
available to the alleged decedent by reason of any

4

fraud or intentional wrongdoing, the alleged decedent may
recover any estate or its proceeds from distributees that is in
their hands, or the value of distributions received by them, to
the extent that any recovery from distributees is equitable in
view of all of the circumstances.
(3) A petition for vacation under either Subsections (1)(a)
or (b) must be filed prior to the earlier of the following time
limits:
(a) If a personal representative has been appointed for the
estate, the time of entry of any order approving final
distribution of the estate, or, if the estate is closed by
statement, six months after the filing of the closing statement.
(b) Whether or not a personal representative has been
appointed for the estate of the decedent, the time prescribed by
Section 75-3-107 when it is no longer possible to initiate an
original proceeding to probate a will of the decedent.
(c) Twelve months after the entry of the order sought to be
vacated.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909. Improper distribution -- Liability of
distributee.
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned
because of adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee
of property improperly distributed or paid, or a claimant who
was improperly paid, is liable to return the property improperly
received and its income since distribution if he has the
property. If he does not have the property, then he is liable to
return the value as of the date of disposition of the property
improperly received and its income and gain received by him.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1004. Liability of distributees to
claimants.
After assets of an estate have been distributed and subject to
Section 75-3-1006, an undischarged claim not barred may be
prosecuted in a proceeding against one or more distributees. No
distributee shall be liable to claimants for amounts received as
exempt property, homestead or family allowances, or for amounts
in excess of the value of his distribution as of the time of
distribution. As between distributees, each shall bear the cost
of satisfaction of unbarred claims as if the claim had been

5

satisfied in the course of administration. Any distributee who
shall have failed to notify other distributees of the demand
made upon him by the claimant in sufficient time to permit them
to join in any proceeding in which the claim was asserted
against him loses his right of contribution against other
distributees.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006. Limitations on actions and
proceedings against distributees.
(1) Unless previously adjudicated in a formal testacy
proceeding or in a proceeding settling the accounts of a
personal representative or otherwise barred, the claim of any
claimant to recover from a distributee who is liable to pay the
claim, and the right of any heir or devisee or of a successor
personal representative acting in their behalf, to recover
property improperly distributed or the value thereof from any
distributee is barred at the later of:
(a) as to a claim by a creditor of the decedent, one year
after the decedent's death; and
(b) as to any other claimant and any heir or devisee, at
the later of:
(i) three years after the decedent's death; or
(ii) one year after the time of distribution thereof.
(2) This section does not bar an action to recover property
or value received as the result of fraud.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The decedent, Louis J. Uzelac lived at 5559 and 5561
Highland Drive for over 40 years.

Together with his wife, Ruth,

he raised his two daughters, Brooke and Allyson, on that
property

(hereinafter "the homestead").

T.135-130

The

homestead originally consisted of three contiguous parcels of

6

land.

R.139

parcel.

The original house still exists on the second

In the early 1960s, a new dwelling house was completed

across two of the parcels.

T. 135-136; R.140

has always been vacant and undeveloped.
in 1974.

The third parcel

R.14 0, R.500

Ruth died

R.420

After the death of his wife Ruth, Louis married Barbara
Bowden in 1976.

The two resided on the homestead property.

Prior to their marriage Louis and Barbara entered into an AnteNuptial Agreement.

Ex.1

The Ante-Nuptial Agreement

acknowledges that both Louis and Barbara had children and
property from prior marriages they wanted to protect.

Ex.1

The

Ante-Nuptial Agreement provided that real property owned prior
to the marriage "shall be the sole and separate property of him
and her or their respective estates."

Ex.4 p. 2

The Ante-

Nuptial Agreement agreed, in the event of Louis' death, to pay
Barbara moving costs "back to her own property; that in addition
thereto, she shall have, in the event of the death of Louis, the
right to reside in the dwelling house of the parties for her
lifetime, or such shorter time as she may elect . . . "

Id.

years after the marriage, Louis made a holographic Will.
The Will stated:
I direct that after all just debts, funeral expenses
and expenses of administration are paid, I give,
devise and bequeath as follows to my children Susan
Brooke Uzelac Mageras and Allyson Drew Uzelac, all of
7

Two
Ex.4

my property, real mixed or personal, share and share
alike, they by mutual agreement to make distribution
to themselves or others as they see fit. To my wife
Barbara Uzelac if she survive me and we be lawfully
wed at the time of my death, she is to receive per
terms of our antenuptial agreement dated March 25,
1976, except for item 2 page 2 is to be covered by
joint bank account which I opened at First Security
Bank of Utah in both of our names and deposited money
as shown this account to belong to her. To my
granddaughters Angela Marie Mageras and Amanda Mageras
I give two thousand dollars1 each, this money to be
deposited in bank accounts which I opened in each of
their names at Tracy Collins Bank and Trust located on
Holladay Blvd, Holladay, Utah.
Id.

Louis lived with Barbara until 1999 when he passed

away.

R.220

During the marriage Louis paid maintenance

costs, taxes, insurance and utilities on the homestead.
T.51, 80
items.

Barbara paid for food and incidental household

T.50, 80

Otherwise, Barbara kept her money and

property separate.

T. 49, 50, 79-81

Barbara continued to reside at the homestead after
Louis' death, and resides there now.

R.650

Courses of Proceedings
After Louis died and his Will was entered into probate,
Barbara at first refused to pay for taxes and insurance on the
homestead.

R.34

After almost two years, the Estate applied for

Court assistance to order Barbara to reimburse the Estate for
"payment of maintenance, real property taxes and insurance" on
1

By way of Codicil, this was later increased to $'.5,000.
8

Ex.4

the homestead.

R.3 0

The Court issued a Minute Entry which

stated that the Ante-Nuptial Agreement "create [s] a life estate
in Barbara Bowden Uzelac.

The owner of a life estate is

responsible for the maintenance of the property and payment of
all taxes."

R.13 6

The Court later signed an Order clarifying

that Barbara had a "life estate determinable" in the two parcels
of real property on which the dwelling house was located but no
life estate in the third parcel.

R.140

Barbara was ordered to

reimburse the Estate for taxes, costs and insurance and to pay
those expenses until the termination of her life estate.

R.140

Two months later, Barbara sued the Estate, alleging various
causes of action and claims.

R.156

All were rejected by the

trial court and, at one point, Barbara was sanctioned.

R.82 8

Barbara has also sued the personal representative's Estate.
See R.1544
Barbara appealed the trial court's judgment after trial.
R.1366

This Court issued the opinion of In re

App 234, 114 P.3d 1164.

Uzelac,

2005 UT

The opinion upheld the trial court on

certain issues but reversed and remanded on one issue.

The

opinion defined the contract term "acquired by the parties" and
remanded to the trial court for consideration of that issue.
At the conclusion of the appeal, counsel for the personal
representative resigned.

R.1464

Attorneys fees spent
9

litigating with Barbara exceeded $200,000.

See R.1586

There

was no more money left in the Estate to fund litigation2.
Disposition in Court Below
On remand, Barbara again asked the trial court to order
Brooke and Allyson to reconvey the homestead into the Estate.
R.1493

As a result, and in order to protect the finality of

Judge Dever's 2003 ruling, Brooke and Allyson formally moved to
appear in the case as Intervenors.

R.1504

After extensive briefing and a hearing, the trial court
issued a written ruling finding that:
•

Brooke and Allyson are general devisees.

•

Barbara was entitled to Judgment against the Estate in
the amount of $23 0,660.

R.1757

R.1754

This amount

represented the amount of cash and stock Louis had at
the time of his death ($305,463.33) minus the amount
of cash held in his name at the time of his marriage
to Barbara in 1976 ($52,012.43) minus adjusted
distributions already received by Barbara ($22,790).
R.1753-1754
•

Barbara does not have a claim to Louis' premarital
property under the Ante-Nuptial Agreement.

2

R.1750

Barbara asserts in her Brief that the 2003 transfer of the
homestead to Brooke and Allyson (subject to Barbara's life
estate) rendered the Estate insolvent. See Brief, p. 9.
This
is not true. The Estate was solvent until 2005. R.1464-1465
10

•

Barbara's request to order Brooke and Allyson to
reconvey the homestead property to the Estate was time
barred.

R.1754

Barbara took this second appeal.
Intervenors, cross appealed.

R.1759

Brooke and Allyson,

R.1768

Statement of Facts
The following facts, not already marshaled above, are also
relevant to this appeal.
1.

Immediately prior to his death, Louis had $277,716 on
deposit in various bank accounts.

R.1005-1006

funds, $201,839.15 was held in POD accounts.

Of these
R.1006

Therefore, $75,876.85 became part of the Estate and the
$201,839.15 passed as a matter of law to the POD
beneficiaries, including Barbara.
2.

When Louis married Barbara in 1976 he had $52,012.42 in
various accounts.

3.

R.1004

When Louis died, he also had the following property which
was liquidated by the Estate:
a.

The third parcel of land adjacent to the homestead
land.

R.1004

property.
b.

This real estate was premarital

R.1005

See Exs. 17, 18, 20

Water shares for the homestead land.
water shares were premarital property.
11

R.1005
Id.

These

c.

Stock valued at 36,950.91.

R.1007

The Estate was

able to later sell3 certain of the stocks for
$27,747.33.

R.1752

The stock sold by the Estate

was marital property.
Immediately prior to and after Louis' death, Barbara
received:
a.

Her life estate in the homestead.

Ex.21

b.

$15,000 from an account Louis held jointly with his
daughters; R.10 06

c.

$4,858.83 in Louis and Barbara's joint account.
Ex.3 5 p.xii

d.

$12,790 in a POD account; R.1006

e.

$10,755 in personal property at the residence.
Ex.36

f.

A vehicle.

g.

Rents from the "original home" on th€> homestead
property.

Ex.36

Ex.3 7 p.xv

Totaling paragraphs 4(b), (c) and (d) above, Barbara
received $32,648.83 in cash after Louis' death.

3

In addition to an unfortunate market decline in the value of
the stock, Barbara failed or refused to turn over certain of the
certificates for three and a half (3%) years. R.1008 She also
failed to turn over the water shares until there was a pending
motion asking for a court order. R.874 and 901 The water
shares, stock and real estate were sold at market value.
12

6.

At all times, Barbara has retained her separate property,
which is substantial.

R.664

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In this unfortunate case Barbara Uzelac, now on her second
appeal, asks the Court of Appeals to reach back four (4) years
and into her deceased husband's premarital property to pay a
devise she could have received in 1999.

The trial court

correctly refused to do this.
The trial court erred, however, when it included the value
of POD accounts in its calculation of property "held at death."
ARGUMENT
1.

BROOKE AND ALLYSON ARE GENERAL DEVISEES. BARBARA HAS
A GENERAL DEVISE CHARGABLE TO SPECIFIC PROPERTY. THE
GRANDDAUGHTERS HAVE GENERAL PECUNIARY DEVISES.
For the first five (5) years after Louis' death, Barbara

attempted to jump ahead of Louis' other beneficiaries by
claiming to be a claiming to be a "creditor" of the Estate4.
trial court and Court of Appeals rejected this argument.

The

R.1475

On remand, Barbara claimed to have a "general pecuniary devise"
which would have entitled her to interest from approximately
November 2000 to the present.

R.1631

4

The Ante-Nuptial

Of course, creditors' claims are payable before distributions
to devisees and are chargeable to general assets of the Estate,
not to specific funds or property. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-801 et

seq.
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Agreement does not provide for the payment of interest to
Barbara.
The trial court property classified the devises.

In

classifying devises, a court should look at the testator's
See generally

overall intent and purpose.
§ 75-1-102(2)(b).

Utah Code Ann.

In this case, a specific finding was made

that Barbara did not have a "general pecuniary devise."

R.1754

Indeed, the ultimate amount of Barbara's devise has been the
subject of much dispute.

See footnote 17 infra.

The order on

remand found that Brooke and Allyson were "general devisees."
R.1754
each) 5 .

The granddaughters had general pecuniary devises ($5000
Ex.4

Unfortunately, Utah case law does not develop

these categories.

Both parties here rely upon the Restatement

and statutory interpretation.
A.

A devise of a sum certain is a pecuniary devise,

A pecuniary devise is ai devise of a specified amount of
money.

Restatement Third, Property § 5.1 Comment, 1999.

Pecuniary means monetary6.

Random House Webster's Unabridged

Dictionary, 2 nd Ed., 2001.

Because it is paid on a sum certain,

5

This was not an express finding on remand. The trial court did
not reach this issue since the Estate is insolvent and there is
no money with which to pay the granddaughters.
6

Pe-cu-ni-ar-y: 1. of or pertaining to money. 2. consisting of
or given or exacted in money or monetary payments.,
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the Code allows for interest to be paid "at the legal rate
beginning one year after the first appointment of a personal
representative until payment . . . "
§ 75-3-904.

Utah Code Ann.

Obviously, interest is not properly assessed on

monetary devises if the amount cannot be ascertained until the
net probate estate is determined and all claims are paid.
The only pecuniary devises that appear in Louis' Will are
the devises to Louis' granddaughters for $5,000 each.

Ex.4

If

the Estate had assets with which to make distributions, these
would theoretically bear interest under Section 904.
B.

The devise to Barbara was a general devise chargeable
to specific property.

The Ante-Nuptial Agreement provided, upon termination of
the marriage by death or otherwise, Barbara would be entitled to
"all property, whether
parties."

real,

personal

Ex.1 (emphasis added)

or mixed

acquired by the

The plain wording of the

agreement demonstrates that this was not meant to be a
"pecuniary devise" but a devise of marital property, in whatever
form it may later be acquired.

Barbara contracted her right to

Louis' premarital property away in 1976.

A recognition of a

classification "general devises chargeable to specific property"
appears in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-902, the abatement statute.
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C.

The devise of "all my property" is a general devise.

The Restatement appropriately notes that u a devise of xall
my property' is a general devise."
§ 5.1 Comment, 1999.

Restatement Third, Property

As argued below, a reading of the Ante-

Nuptial Agreement and the Will clearly demonstrates that Louis
intended to devise "all his premarital property" to his
daughters and "all his marital property" to his wife.

"The

category into which a particular devise falls is a question of
construction, on which the testator's overall purpose is
relevant."

Id.

This Court should uphold the trial court's classification
of these devises as consistent with Louis overall intent.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE INCLUDED THE VALUE OF
LOUIS' POD ACCOUNTS IN THE JUDGMENT. THE TRIAL COURT
FORGOT TO DEBIT BARBARA, FOR $4,858.83 ON DEPOSIT IN A JOINT
ACCOUNT.
On remand the trial court was directed to determine the

amount "acquired by the parties during the marriage and held at
death."

R.1478 fn.2

It its order, the trial court figured this

amount by taking the amount of cash/stock Louis had in accounts
at the time of his death and subtracting the cash Louis had at
the time of the marriage.

There was no evidence introduced at

16

the trial by which to calculate the source of deposits7 during
the marriage (be they from marital or premarital sources) and so
the trial court chose to use this calculation8.
However, the trial court was supposed to determine what was
acquired by the parties and held at death.
the trial court clearly erred.

R.1478 fn.2

Herein

Definitionally, POD accounts are

outside the probate estate and are not "held at death."

The

trial court mistakenly included the value of the POD accounts in
calculating its Judgment.

Therefore, instead of using the

initial figure of $305,463.33 as the total amount of money and
after acquired stock "held at death" (R.1752) the trial court
should have used $103,624.18 ($75,876.85 held in non-POD
accounts at death (R.1005-1006) plus $27,747.33 (after-acquired
stock R.1752)).

Subtracting the amount of cash held in Louis'

name at the time of his marriage to Barbara in 1976 ($52,012.43)
minus adjusted distributions already received by Barbara
($32,648. 83) 9 , the Judgment amount is properly $18,962.92.

7

Louis sold premarital property in Draper and Spring City but
these proceeds were never accounted for. See R.32 Louis sold
his premarital business and those proceeds were not accounted
for or traced by either the Estate or Barbara. R.3 91 See
also
R.657
8

Barbara attempted to augment this amount by claiming amounts
Louis spent on giving gifts to his daughters during his lifetime
should be credited back to her. See e.g. R.1068
9

See Statement of Facts, paragraph 5, above.
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It is well-settled that POD accounts are not "held at
death."

Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-205(1) (a) Mt]he decedent's

ownership interest in property or accounts in POD registration
with the right of survivorship" are included in the definition
of "Property owned . . . by the decedent immediately
death

before

that passed outside probate at the decedent's death.

Id.

(emphasis added) "Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a
party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or
parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is a
clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the
time the account is created."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1)

Under the plain terms of Utah law, the POD accounts were never
assets of the probate estate, the personal representative never
had jurisdiction over them and could not have been expected to
distribute them to Barbara.
3.

THE HOMESTEAD IS ENCUMBERED BY BARBARA'S POSSESSORY
INTEREST AND IS NOT CAPABLE OF BEING AN ASSET OF THE
ESTATE.
The Ante-Nuptial Agreement granted Barbara "the right to

reside in the dwelling house of the parties for her lifetime, or
such shorter time as she may elect . . . "

Ex.4

In 2 001 the

trial court held this was a "life estate determinable."

R.138

Indeed Barbara has been residing continuously at the homestead
since Louis' death in 1999.

R.650
18

Barbara's life estate is a possessory interest.
BACKMAN ON UTAH REAL PROPERTY,

1999, § 2.02(d) (1) .

THOMAS AND

It is terminable

at Barbara's death or if she moves from the premises or
remarries.

Id.

at § 2.02(d)(2).

At no time from 1999-2007

could the Estate have liquidated that property in order to pay
claims.

Since the homestead is clearly premarital property and

Barbara's limited interest in the property had been
adjudicated10, the Estate deeded the property to Brooke and
Allyson in 2003.

R.136; Ex.21

After the Court's ruling in 2001

(R.138) the property could not possibly have been a general
asset of the Estate since it was, and is, encumbered with
Barbara's possessory interest.

Barbara cannot sell the life

estate because it cannot exist without her.
Paradoxically and without supporting authority, the Estate
asked on remand for the distributees to reconvey the property to
the Estate, the Court to order the property sold and for it to
order that Barbara be paid a "value" for her life estate.
R.1633-1640

A hypothetical demonstrates the impossibility of

Barbara's prayer for relief:

suppose Louis had devised a life

estate in the homestead to "Bob Jones."

10

A district court could

Adjudication serves to protect the personal representative and
the distributee alike. Adjudication also starts the clock on
limitations and appeal rights for adverse parties and promotes
the policies of finality and efficiency in the Code.
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not, on one beneficiary's request, order the property sold to
satisfy a devise (which was chargeable to other, specific
property), eject Bob from his life estate and pay him a "value"
for it.
4.

BARBARA'S ATTEMPT ON REMAND TO COMPEL BROOKE AND ALLYSON
TO RECONVEY THE HOMESTEAD TO THE ESTATE WAS TIME-BARRED.
Barbara argues, precariously, that her 2003 motion was a

"proceeding" under the probate code and that she was never
required to file a proceeding against Brooke and Allyson to
preserve her right to reclaim the homestead after distribution.
However, if the 2003 Motion was a proceeding, Judge Dever's
denial of the same was final and appealable.

As demonstrated

below, Barbara is time barred either way.
A,

If, as Barbara claims, her "Petition" was a
"proceeding" under the Probate Code, the time to
vacate or appeal the Court's Order was long-expired.

In 2001, the Estate applied to the trial court for
assistance regarding the homestead property's maintenance.

R.52

The trial court made an order in which it ruled that Barbara had
a life estate determinable in the homestead.

R.136

Pursuant to

that Order, the personal representative deeded the homestead to
Brooke and Allyson in 2003 subject to Barbara's life estate
determinable.

Ex.21

A few months later, Barbara filed a "Motion for an Order
Directing Beneficiaries to Return Estate Property to the Estate,
20

or in the Alternative Voiding the Deed of Distribution."

R.912

Both the Estate and Brooke and Allyson opposed the motion. R.942
and R.959

The trial court denied the request, rejecting

Barbara's substantive arguments that the conveyance was a
"conflicting interest transaction" and prematurely harmed her
rights as a creditor of the Estate.
is dated September 29, 2003.

R.1080

The Court's order

R.1080-1084; Addendum 4

A "formal proceeding" is a "proceeding [] conducted before a
judge with notice to interested persons."
§ 75-1-201(18).
proceeding.

Utah Code Ann.

Barbara claims her 2003 motion is such a

See Brief at p. 13.

The Utah Uniform Probate Code

states the following relevant legal principals:

"Each

proceeding before the court or registrar is independent of any
other proceeding involving the same estate."
§ 75-3-106(1) (a).

Utah Code Ann.

"[A]11 proceedings and actions to enforce a

claim against the estate are governed by the procedure
prescribed by [] Chapter 3" of Title 75.

"Subject to appeal and

subject to vacation . . . a formal testacy order . . . is final
as to all persons with respect to all issues concerning the
decedent's estate the court considered or might have considered
incident to its rendition.

..."

412 (a) .

21

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-

The Court's 2003 order in Barbara's "proceeding" was
therefore "a final order" under Section 412(1) and immediately
appealable.

Under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, "[ajppellate

review . . .

is governed by the rules applicable to the appeals

to the Supreme Court in equity cases from the court of general
jurisdiction. . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-308.

Those rules

state that appeals may be taken from "all final orders11" within
3 0 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from.12"

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) provides appellate

jurisdiction "over . . . orders . . . of any court of record
. . . over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction."

Barbara did not file a timely appeal

after the order was rendered in her proceeding in 2003.
This view of statutory construction is supported by the

case law.

In In re Estate

of Christensen

v. Christensen,

655

P.2d 646 (Utah 1982) Christensen's Will was admitted to probate.
Christensen's wife then filed a petition alleging that she was
an "omitted spouse" and for an order awarding her the proceeds
of the sale of an automobile.

The trial court denied the relief

and the wife filed an appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court, citing

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412, held that the order of the district
11

Utah R. App. P. 3 (a) .

12

Utah R. App. P. 4 (a) .
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court was a "final appealable order" and took jurisdiction.
at 648.

Id.

"The order . . . resolv[ed] an issue of vital

importance and conclud[ed] a major phase in the process of
formal testacy proceedings.

Failure to allow an appeal from

such an order could compel all subsequent proceedings, including
partial distributions, to go forward under a cloud of
uncertainty that would seriously impair the personal
representative's efforts to administer the estate."

Id.

Other Utah decisions have similarly recognized that an
order in a probate "proceeding" is a final order for purposes of
appeal.

For example, in In re Estate

of Bacon,

556 P.2d 1271,

1272 (Utah 1976) the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's refusal to hear late objections relating to the subject
matter of a probate order as "an attempt to raise and
re-litigate issues."

In In re Estate

of Vorhees,

366 P.2d 977,

98 0 (Utah 1961), the Utah Supreme Court held an order compelling
a decedent's widow to transfer land to the estate was final
although the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction over
other estate matters.

The court premised its holding on the

fact that the order decided "the real issue" in the case and
"did not leave open for reconsideration the question as to who
owned that property."

Id.

The court concluded that "there was

23

Id.

nothing further to be decided on that particular issue."
It then heard the appeal.
Finally, in In re Estate

of Morrison,

933 P.2d 1015 (Utah

Ct. App. 1997), ordering an opposite result as the one here, the
trial judge had ordered a distributee to return stock to the
estate.

In holding that order to be final and appealable, this

Court noted that "Utah has effectively adopted [a] pragmatic,
case-by-case approach to finality in probate matters."
1016.

Id.

at

Whether or not the stock would be returned to the estate

was "an issue of vital importance" and appellate review at that
stage "remove[d] the 'cloud of uncertainty.'"

The Court

recognized that if the issue were not resolved at that stage on
appeal, the "case would effectively end because no money would
be available to pay claims against the estate or administrative
expenses."

Id.

This case differs inasmuch as Barbara did not

appeal the final appealable order in 2003.
Similarly, Barbara missed the statutory time to apply for
vacation of the 2 003 order.

"A petition13 for vacation . . .

must be filed prior to the earlier of the following time limits
. . . [tjwelve months after the entry of the order sought to be

A "petition" is a "written request to the court for an order
after notice." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(37).
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vacated."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412(3)(c).

No Petition for

Vacation was ever filed in this case.
If, as Barbara asserts, her 2003 Petition qualified as a
"proceeding" she let the time periods for appeal and vacation of
that Order lapse.

These failures seal the finality provisions

of Section 412.
B.

If Barbara was required to file a proceeding "Against
the Distributees'' in order to recover property already
distributed/ the time to file has long-expired.

Brooke and Allyson are, and at all times since May, 2003
have been, distributees of the Estate.
§ 75-1-201(13); Ex.21

Utah Code Ann.

The Utah Uniform Probate Code also

contains procedures to cover proceedings *[a]fter distribution14"
for claims that have not been barred15.

Recovery may be sought

"from [] distributees as provided in Section 75-3-1004."
Code Ann. § 75-3-104.

Section 1004 seems to apply:

Utah

"After

assets of an estate have been distributed and subject to Section
75-3-1006, an undischarged claim not barred16 may be prosecuted
in a proceeding against one or more distributees."

14

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104.

15

If the Court agrees with Barbara that her 2003 "Petition" was
a "formal proceeding" under Chapter 3, the claim is arguably
"barred" as anticipated in this statute.
See footnote [15].
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Section 1006 states that "unless previously barred by
adjudication

. . . the claim of any claimant to recover from a

distribute who is liable to pay the claim and the right of any
heir or devisee or of a successor personal representative acting
in their behalf, to recover property improperly distributed or
the value thereof from any distribute is barred at the later of
. . . (b)(ii) one year after the time of distribution thereof."
Therefore, if this Court finds that Barbara's claim to recover
distributed property is not "previously barred by adjudication"
as analyzed in Section 4.A above, her claim is barred by Utah
Code Ann. § 75-3-1006(1) (b) (ii) .
C.

Public policy, principles of law and the purposes and
policies of the Uniform Probate Code favor this
result.

To illustrate the correctness of this result, it is helpful
to consider a few factual realities about this six-year long
piece of litigation.

First, it is significant that the

distributees, Brooke and Allyson, are residents of Nevada.

R.2

There is no provision in the Utah Uniform Probate Code that a
Court automatically has jurisdiction over non-resident
distributees.

Arguably, Barbara would have had to succeed in

her 2 0 03 "proceeding" and then enforce that order under Section
104.

In other words, in this hypothetical, Barbara would have

had an "undischarged claim not barred" and would have had one
26

year from distribution in which to commence a proceeding against
the distributees for the return of the property.

In order for

this Court to gain personal jurisdiction17 over them, Brooke and
Allyson would have had to be sued in Nevada.
Second, Barbara claims in her brief that the 2003
distribution to Brooke and Allyson ''rendered the Estate
insolvent."

Brief at p.9.

The Estate was initially possessed

of $75,876.85 in cash, $16,975.41 in stock and $96,600.00 in
liquidated pre-marital property.

R.1005-1008, 1580

This money

was spent on administration/litigation over a period of five (5)
years.

The Estate was solvent until 2005.

17

If, at any time,

The trial court obviously has subject matter jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. 75-1-303(4) but, post-distribution,
personal jurisdiction must be obtained "against the
distributee." In this case, personal jurisdiction was in Nevada
and would necessarily have been a separate action.
27

Barbara would have stopped her litigation on the seven (7)
unsuccessful claims 18 , money could have been distributed.
Third, the stated purposes of the Utah Uniform Probate Code
are to "discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in
distribution of his property" and to "promote a speedy and
efficient system for administering the estate of the decedent
and making distribution to his successors."
§ 75-1-102(2)(b) and

Utah Code Ann.

(c). A simple reading of the Will and the

Ante-Nuptial Agreement show that Louis intended to will "all of
his

[premarital] property to his daughters.

The Ante-Nuptial

Agreement defined Barbara's interest in the homestead:

life

Over time Barbara's claims have included:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

that she was a licensee not a life tenant R.52
a claim to creditor status R.1475
a claim to a life insurance policy R.220
a claim to remove the personal representative R.822
an attempt to freeze the Estate's assets R.825
a claim to "lost' civil service payments R.680
claims for a homestead allowance, family allowance and
elective share R.58
a claim to health insurance R.221
a claim for accident insurance R.682
cost of living increases in the above R.220
reimbursement for a lost annuity R.221
an attempt to be appointed successor personal
representative R.1256
a claim to the value of stock on the date of death, not on
the date the stock was sold R.1641
a claim to gifts Louis gave his daughters during the
marriage R.1644

All have been resolved against Barbara on their me^rits and are
no longer a part of this appeal.
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tenant.

The efficient and relatively informal probate system,

by which "every proceeding is independent of every other
proceeding"19 provides the possibility for finality and speedy
appellate review of final orders.
observed in the Christensen,
above.

Vorhees

These policies are noted and
and Morrison

cases cited

Through Section 1006, the Code sets an "ultimate time

limit within which creditors, heirs and devisees of a decedent
may recover from distributees."

Uniform Probate Code Practice

Manual, 2nd Edition, Section 3-1006 Comment, p. 375 (emphasis
added).

Barbara's interest in the homestead was determined long

ago.
5.

LOUIS' OVERALL INTENT WAS TO BEQUEATH HIS SEPARATE
PROPERTY TO HIS DAUGHTERS.
Prior to his marriage to Barbara, Louis took steps to

protect his separate property "for his heirs."

Louis contracted

with Barbara for his separate property to be separate and,
reciprocally, for her separate property to be separate.

Shortly

thereafter, in his Will he left "all my property" to his
children.

The only logical conclusion is that he meant "all my

[separate] property."
Louis did not disinherit Barbara.

He provided for her in

his Will by stating she would "take per the terms of our

19

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-106(1) (a)
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antinuptial agreement:" terms negotiated and agreed upon by
Louis and Barbara themselves.

Barbara's distributions under the

Will are outlined in the Statement of Facts, Paragraph 4 above.
It is undisputed that the only property "acquired by the
parties during the marriage" was money/cash.

R.1585

undisputed that the homestead is premarital property.
1005

It is
R.1004-

At the time of Louis' death, the Estate was originally

possessed of $75,876.85 and obtained an additional $96,600 by
liquidating non-cash assets such as (premarital) real estate and
water shares.
It is undisputed that expenses of administration, creditors
and funeral expenses are paid before any of the legacies in the
will are paid.

Utah Code Arm. § 75-3-805.

As established

above, Barbara's legacy (property "acquired by the parties
during the marriage") was a general devise chargeable to
specific property:

i.e. the cash acquired by the parties during

the marriage.
The cash on hand at death was spent in litigation with
Barbara who was unsuccessful on all but one (1) of her claims.
It would be patently violative of Louis' intent to now allow
Barbara to reach premarital property to recoup the cash she
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(through four20 (4) lawyers and more than six (6) years of
litigation) forced the Estate to spend.
As the trial court found, there is no residual devise in
Louis' will.

R.1754 fn.l

The Ante-Nuptial Agreement provided

that all property ''acquired by the parties during the marriage,"
or marital property, was devised to Barbara.
devise chargeable to specific property.

This was a general
supra.

See Argument l.B

The will provided that "all my [separate] Property" was devised
to Brooke and Allyson, a general devise.

The granddaughters

were granted general pecuniary devises of $5,000 each.
The Estate collected and spent both marital and
premarital property on administration (litigation).

The

homestead is not an asset of the Estate subject to
liquidation because of Barbara's life estate.
3.

See Argument

supra.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Court of Appeals should deny Barbara's various claims

for relief including the request that the Court of Appeals order
the beneficiaries to reconvey the property to the Estate.

20

Not

See various appearances and withdrawals of counsel at R.26
(McCullough) R.52 (Kanell), R.870 (Hill) and R.903 (Bennett).
It is submitted that Barbara's theories and strategies have
changed over time and with her changes in counsel; those changes
and choices, and not fundamental unfairness in the Will of Louis
Uzelac or the Utah Uniform Probate Code, have caused the result.
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only is this request time barred and violative of Louis' obvious
intent but it is not relief properly ordered directly from the
appellate level.

Furthermore, there is no appellate

jurisdiction to order this relief in 2007.

The personal

representative's deed of distribution to Barbara, Brooke and
Allyson was made after an adjudication.

A proceeding to recover

the property was denied in 2 003 and that order became final 3 0
days after its entry.
The Court of Appeals should uphold the trial court's
rulings on remand with one exception.

The value of the POD

accounts should not have been included in the calculation of
marital property Louis "held at death."

The case should be

remanded and Judgment should enter in favor of Barbara and
against the Estate in the amount of $18,962.92.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007.
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.

largaretH.Olson,Esq.
Of Counsel
Counsel for Interveners/
Cross Appellants Susan Brooke
Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing (Amended) Brief of Intervenors/Cross Appellants were
hand delivered to the following:
Charles M. Bennett
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
257 West 200 South, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2142
with a courtesy copy to:
Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr.
535 West Sweetwater Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85 029
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007.
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ADDENDUM

Notice of Cross Appeal, dated September 19, 2006

Personal Representative's Deed of Distribution,
dated May 29, 2003

Motion for an Order Directing Beneficiaries to
Return Estate Property to the Estate, or in the
Alternative Voiding the Deed of Distribution, dated
July 25, 2003

Final Order denying Motion for an Order Directing
Beneficiaries to Return Estate Property to the
Estate, or in the Alternative Voiding the Deed of
Distribution, dated September 29, 2003
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Salt Lake City, Utah S41II
Attn: Mary C. Gordon, Esq.

PERSONAL REPRESENT* FIVE'S DEED OF DISTRIBUTION

GO
THIS DEED is made by Joseph G. Uzelac, as personal representative of'The 'Estate of Louis J. Uzelac,
deceased ("Grantor"), to Susan Brooke Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac, whose address is 4200 East Lodewyck
Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89121, subject to a life estate determinable in Barbara Uzelac, whose address is 5561 South
Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117.
WHEREAS Grantor is the qualified personal representative of said estate, filed as Probate Number Probate
No. 993901690 in Salt Lake County, Utah; and
WHEREAS pursuant to the Order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
(Judge L.A. Dever) dated December 18,2001 and attached hereto as Exhibit A (the "Order"), Barbara Uzelac
has a life estate determinable in such real estate as set forth in that certain Antenuptial Agreement dated March 25,
1976 between the deceased and Barbara Bowden [Uzelac], and as the life tenant, is responsible for payment of all
taxes, maintenance costs, and the cost of insuring such real estate against loss since November 6, 1999 until the
termination of her tenancy; and
WHEREAS Susan Brooke Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac are entitled to distribution of the hereinafter
described real property, subject to the life estate determinable in Barbara 1 Izelac as set forth in the Order;
rHEREFORE pursuant to the Order, Grantor hereby conveys and releases to Susan Brooke Mageras and
Allyson D. Uzelac, subject to the right of Barbara Uzelac to reside in the dwelling house located on such property
for her lifetime, or such shorter time as she may elect, and provided that in the event that Barbara Uzelac should
remarry, she shall move therefrom within a reasonable time back to her own separate property, the following
described real property in located Salt Lake County, Utah:
TAX' ID NO 2 2 - 1 5 - 1 0 3 - 0 0 6 - 0 0 0 0
COM 1504.7 Ft N ft W ^ Cor of Sec 15 1 2S R IE, SI ! I • il! 1" 8 1 20 ' V 203.8
Ft to Cen of Highland Drive, N 0°42' '.V 74 Ft E 5 39.8. !• V"; G Z " « 0S.\ ft \i
87°20 , W 293 Ft to Beg.
TAX ID NO. 2 2 - 1 5 - 1 0 3 - 0 0 5 - 0 0 0
COM 1504.7 ft. N & N 87°20i W 203.8 Ft & N 0°42* W 74 Ft fr W % Cor Sec
15 T 2S, R 1E, SL Mer» N 0°42# W 150 Ft E 531 06 Ft S 8° W 151 7 Ft W
509.84 Ft to Beg.
with all appuilend 11cr/
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)ss.
)

On the 25\ day of May, 2003, personally appeared before me Joseph G. Uzelac, the signer of the above
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

ZLLLJLM*.

Notary Public
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Jack M. Morgan, Jr. (Bar No. 6941)
Mary C. Gordon {Bar No. 6880)
MANMNG CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR LLC
Third Floor Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84
Telephone: (801) 363 n ^
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j ib THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ES \.K,
LOUIS J. UZELAC,
Deceased.

ORDER ON ESTATE'S MO J •« >IM
FOR ASSISTANCE IN
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATL

TDtau No 993901690
Judge L. A

On July 12, 2001, the >- ,M;f <•> M,I. . <, n.
luistrauun oi csmie.
•.in for (I) Homestead

•~<«:ite"» fiiH a Motion for Assistance m
of Louis J. Uzelac, filed
owance; and H) Elective Share of Barbara

„iiu on November 6, 20(11. Mary C.
Gordon ant! Ja K M Morean
on behalf c

-u....- >

„*...».. Wl the Estate; Theodore E. Kanell appeared
ison appeared on behalf of Susan Brooke Mageras

and Allyson D. Uzelac, chnun-u vi mc ucicucm and beneficiaries under his will.
Based upon th- pleadings and affidavits on file in this matter he memm anda o«" <h-

GO

parties, ihh m>:>
an
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following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There has been no challenge to the validity of the Ante Nuptial Agreement dated

March 25, 1976, by and between Louis J. Uzelac and Barbara Bowden [Uzelac] ("Ante Nuptial
Agreement,,), and the Courtfindsno basis for any such challenge. Accordingly, the Court
concludes as a matter of law that the Ante Nuptial Agreement is a valid and binding contract,
subject to ordinary contract principles. In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343,1346 (Utah 1994).
2.

It is undisputed by the parties that at the time of the marriage, Louis Uzelac's

assets included three parcels of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, identified as
follows:
COM 1504.7 Ft N fr W 1/4 Cor of Sec 15 T 2S,
R IE, SL Mer, N 87°20f W 203.8 Ft to Cen of
Highland Drive, N 0°42' W 74 Ft E 509.84 Ft
S 8°W 98.1 Ft N 97°20f W 293 Ft to Beg.
1 Ac.
(Book 3485 Page 498)
COM 1504.7 ft. N & N 87°20' W 203.8 Ft & N
0°4T W 74 Ft fr W 1/4 Cor Sec 15 T 2S, R
1E, SL Mer, N 0^2* W 150 Ft E 531.06 Ft
S 8° W 151.7 Ft W 509.84 Ft to Beg 2 Ac.
(Book 3485, Page 499)
Lot # 1 of Cottonwood Glade Sub Division according
to the official plat thereof.
(Book 3486, Page 420).
3.

The Ante Nuptial Agreement provides that Ms. Uzelac "shall have, in the event of

the death of Louis, the right to reside in the dwelling house of the parties for her lifetime, or such
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,ID J. Uzelac died on November 6 I •) W Mim n1 m ii i iiiiii , i I. mi 11 ciac lias
:~tate Property ar, ll

occupied the
maintenanceui u
Sheppick,

nnerrv

l

'

As the life tenant, she is responsible fbi the
ill ill il IM" . iiiiililll hri ili in in \ iniiniKilci

M\\\ IUII'IIH'III

Sheppickv.
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" i zd upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters the following

1
piiiiMHiH

Barbara Uzelac, as the life tenant, is responsible for payment of all taxes,
ni»i., m I iil

ni nl i u mi1", ui r I ill bslale I'topeity against loss since N o v e m b e r

6 , 1 9 9 9 until the termination of her tenancy.
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Uaibai.i U'zdac shall immeilidl Iv fciiiibuise l(lllt,ll I "j.ilc lb.ra.ll faxes paid by the

Estate on the Life Estate Property since November
*v'ween the Estate and Ms. Uzelac.
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3.

Barbara Uzelac shall immediately reimburse the Estate for all maintenance costs

incurred by the Estate to maintain the Life Estate Property since November 6, 1999.
4.

Barbara Uzelac shall immediately reimburse the Estate for all costs incurred by

the Estate to insure the Life Estate Property since November 6,1999.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this Y \ dav of December, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
&BEDNARLLC

Mary OLyordon, Esq.
Attorneys for the Estate of Louis J. Uzelac
PLANT WALLACE CHR1STENSEN & KANELL

Theodore E. Kanell, Esq.
Attorneys for Barbara Uzelac
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON
ESTATE'S MOTION FOR ASSISTANCE IN ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE to t
by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, this \'A day of December, 2001, to the following:

it

Margaret Olson, Esq.
HOBBSADONDAKIS& OLSON
341 South Main Street, #208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for AUyson Uzclac & Brooke Mageras
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq.
PLANT WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, #1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 111
Attorneys for Barbara Uzeiac
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BLACKBURN & a i
CHARLES M. BENN
77 W. 200 So. St., Suite 400
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Attorneys tor B M*BARA BOWDKN IUVA A« '
1AJLD1S

r COURT OF SALT L AK*. i XH

STATE OF UTAH
4; 4* 4- «*• -i-

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:
LOUIS I. II/.EI.AI

JAKBARA UZELAC'S MOTION
FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING
BENEFICIARIES TO RETURN
ESTATE PROPERTY TO THE
ESTATE, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE VOIDING THE
DEED OF DISTRIBUTION
.19111690

Barbara Uzelac, through her counsel of record, moves the Court for an Order ret:-!- i
••

•

.

-n distributed property to the estate by executing the deed attacned

as Exhibit '• in :n ilternative, Barbara moves the Court for an Order voiding rh
ara further has a claim for attorney fees and costs; however,
she is asking the Court to reserve that issue until the trial of this matter
rasis of this motion is that the personal representative breached his duty by making this
uu'-w

md there will be no prejudice to the beneficial

..i^a tlita^vday ot July, 2003.

;

* motion.

BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Charles M. Bennett, Attorneys for Barbara Uzelac
H:\CMB\PLEADINGS ETaUZELAC-MOTION-RETURN-PROP.MOT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BARBARA
UZELAC'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING BENEFICIARIES TO RETURN
ESTATE PROPERTY TO THE ESTATE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE VOIDING THE
DEED OF DISTRIBUTION was mailed to the following person this :%f~day of July, 2003:
Margaret H. Olson
Hobbs & Olson
525 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Mary Gordon
Lee Curtis
Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bender
3rd Floor Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Angela Marie Mageras
4200 East Lodewyck Drive
Las Vegas, NV 89121
Amanda D. Mageras
4200 East Lodewyck Drive
Las Vegas, NV 89121

H:\CMB\PLEADINGS ETOUZELAC-MOTION-RETURN-PROP.MOT

"Exhibit A

EXHIBIT A
When recorded, mail to:
Charles M. Bennett
Blackburn & Stoll, LC
77 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

Mail tax notice to:
Barbara Uzelac
5561 Highland Dr.
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

QUIT CLAIM DEED
Grantors, pursuant to the Order of the Court on
, 2003, in the Matter of the
Estate of Louis J. Uzelac, State of Utah, Third District Court, Probate No. 993901690, and in
order to reverse the Personal Representative Deed dated May 29,2003 and recorded on June 4,
2003 in Book 8811 Page 2614 Entry No. 8675566, hereby quit claim, transfer, and convey,
without warranty, to Joseph Uzelac, Personal Representative of the Estate of Louis J. Uzelac,
grantee, the following described real property in Salt Lake County, Utah:
1.

COM 1504.7 Ft N fr W 1/4 Cor of Sec 15 T 2S, R IE, SL Mer N 87° 20' W 203.8
Ft to Cen of Highland Drive, N 0° 42' W 74 Ft E 509.84 Ft S 8°W 98.1 Ft N
87°20' W 293 Ft to Beg.
The tax identification number for this property is 22-15-103-006-0000.

2.

COM 1504.7 Ft N & N 87° 20' W 203.8 Ft & N 0° 42' W 74 Ft fr W 1/4 Cor Sec
15 T 2S, R IE, SL Mer, N 0° 42' W 150 Ft E 531.06 Ft S 8° W 151.7 Ft W 509.84
Ft to Beg.

The tax identification number for this property is 22-15-103-005-0000.
Each grantor warrants that she has taken no action to transfer or encumber the described
property.
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DATED this

day of July, 2003.

Barbara Uzelac
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

The foregoing inatrumeirt was ackiiuwled^ed belbie llltf tills
day ot July, 2UU3, by
Barbara Uzelac, who being first duly sworn, stated that she executed the foregoing quit claim
deed and that the facts recited therein are true and correct.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in:
My Commission Expires:

DATED this

day of July, 2003.

Susan Brooke Mageras
STATE OF NEVADA
COUNTY OF

)
: ss.
)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
day of July, 2003, by
Susan Brooke Mageras, who being first duly sworn, stated that she executed the foregoing quit
claim deed and that the facts recited therein are true and correct.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in:
My Commission Expires:

Page 2

DATED this

day of July, 2003.

Allyson D. Uzelac

STATE OF NEVADA

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
day of July, 2003, by
Allyson D. Uzelac, who being first duly sworn, stated that she executed the foregoing quit claim
deed and that the facts recited therein are true and correct.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in:
My Commission Expires:
H:\CMB\CONTRACTS\UZEIAC-QUIT-CLAIM-DEED.QCD
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BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283)
77 W. 200 So. St., Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)521-7900

^ 2 8 2003
KECOUNTV

Attorneys for BARBARA BOWDEN UZELAC
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:
LOUIS J. UZELAC
Deceased.

* * * * *

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BARBARA UZELAC'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF HER MOTION FOR AN
ORDER DIRECTING
BENEFICIARIES TO RETURN
ESTATE PROPERTY TO THE
ESTATE, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE VOIDING THE
DEED OF DISTRIBUTION

)

Probate No. 993901690

)

Judge Dever
4c *

Barbara Uzelac, through her counsel of record, files this Memorandum in support of her
Motion for an Order requiring the beneficiaries of the estate to return distributed property to the
estate by executing the deed attached to her Motion as Exhibit A, or in the alternative, for an Order
voiding the personal representative's May 31,2003 deed (attached hereto as Exhibit C).
FACTS
1.

Barbara Uzelac has a claim against the estate based on her ante-nuptial agreement

with her husband Louis (the "Contract"). See Exhibit A.

2.

Barbara claims that the personal representative has breached the terms of the

Contract by failing to distribute to her all property "acquired by the parties" during their marriage.
3.

The personal representative's defense to Barbara's claim is based on an

interpretation of the Contract that "acquired by the parties" should mean "acquired by the parties"
together or jointly or, if acquired separately, commingled with the other party's property.
4.

Barbara's claim is based on interpreting the Contract to mean "acquired by the

parties" in any way an acquisition can be made, whether jointly, separately, or otherwise, and
without regard to how the property was held by the parties after the acquisition.
5.

Louis prepared a list of his bank accounts on February 1, 1976. See Exhibit B. The

total of his accounts as of that date equaled $51,497.45,
6.

Using Exhibit B as a starting point, Barbara has calculated the value of Louis' bank

accounts on April 14,1976, the date of the marriage, as follows:
{Date
|

Financial Institution

Balance

Interest

4/14/76

|

2/1/76 Walker Bank & Trust

$

2,000.00 $ 20.00 | $

2,020.00

1 2/1/76 Walker Bank & Trust

$

2,000.00 $ 20.00 $

2,020.00

1 2/1/76 Walker Bank & Trust

$

1,000.00 $ 10.00 $

1,010.00

2/1/76 Zions Bank

$

2,000.00 $ 20.00 $

2,020.00 ]

1 2/1/76 Zions Bank

$

2,000.00 $ 20.00 $

2,020.001

1 2/1/76 Zions Bank

$

1,000.00 $ 10.00 $

1,010.00|

1 2/1/76 Associated Federal Employees $ 6,985.53 $ 69.86 $

7,055.391

|

Federal Credit Union
|

2/1/76 Tracy

1 2/1/76 Walker Bank & Trust

$ 10,830.36 $ 108.30 $

10,938.661

9,296.12 $ 92.96 $

9,389.081

$

-2-

Date
|

Financial Institution

2/1/76 Prudential

Balance

Interest

4/14/76

]

$ 7,172.57 $ 71.73 $

7,244.301

1 2/1/76 First Security Bank

$ 4,212.87 $ 42.13 $

4,255.001

1 2/1/76 Credit Union

$ 3,000.00 $ 30.00 $

3,030.001

$ 51,497.45 $514.98
7.

$

52,012.43 |

Based on the Affidavit of Joseph Uzelac, Louis owned the following accounts at his

death with the values listed at his date of death:
Financial Institution

Value at Date of Death

Associated Federal Credit Union, No. 18597

$

68,669.15

1 First Security Bank, No. 070551007602

$

12,744.71

1 First Security Bank, No. 070551007603

$

68,575.071

1 First Security Bank, No. 067-10751-33

$

| Beehive Credit Union, No. 105049

$

31,316.82 |

1 Bank One, No. 7778-6136

$

16,559.641

US Bank, No. 1-531-0024-5551

$

36,183.08 |

US Bank, No. 3-531-0007-2308

$

21,544.75 |

TOTAL $

261,996.53J

6,403.31 1

Although the personal representative represented that these values are date of death values, in
several cases that is not correct. However, for purposes of this motion, the errors make no
difference to the issue before the Court.
8.

As explained below, Barbara calculates her entitlements under the Contract to be at

least $189,894.

-3-

9.

On May 31,2003, the personal representative distributed the remaining 3+ acres of

real property on Highland Drive owned by the estate (the "Highland Drive Property") to Susan
Brooke Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac subject to a life estate in Barbara Uzelac. See Exhibit C.
10.

On May 31, 2003, the personal representative sold the vacant lot on Pheasant Circle

and all remaining water shares to the Goff Trust (the "Pheasant Circle Property") for $84,600.00 for
the land and $12,000 for the water shares.
11.

On December 6,2001, DCH Holdings made an offer to purchase the Highland Drive

property plus the lot on Pheasant Circle for $ 1,100,000.00. See Exhibit D.
12.

While Barbara does not know the exact value of the assets remaining in the estate, it

is no more than the $96,600.00 that could have been received on the sale of the Pheasant Circle
property plus a claim for some of the tangible personal property in Barbara's possession.
13.

The Personal Representative represented to Barbara's former counsel, John Hill, that

the reason for the sale of the Pheasant Circle lot was to raise money to pay administrative expenses.
Calculation of Damages
Although a strict reading of the Contract could lead one to conclude that the surviving
spouse would be entitled to everything acquired during the marriage without any reductions,
Barbara believes this interpretation would be unreasonable. Barbara believes that all property
"acquired by the parties" should be interpreted to mean all acquisitions by Louis and herself less the
living expenses that they paid with those acquisitions. That is a reasonable interpretation of what
the Contract means when it refers to all property "acquired by the parties."

-4-

Based on this interpretation, Barbara has will calculate at trial her entitlements under the
Contract by taking Louis' assets at the time of his death and subtracting therefiom his assets at the
time of Louis's and her marriage. She notes that this amount would need to be adjusted if any of
the acquisitions during the marriage came within the provisions of Paragraph 9 of the Contract.
That paragraph treats the sales proceeds and any exchanged property from any property owned by
either party at the time of the marriage as pre-marital property and not "as property acquired during
the marriage." For purposes of this motion and in order to avoid issues regarding the application of
paragraph 9 to stocks and real estate, Barbara has calculated her minimum entitlement based on the
value of Louis' bank accounts upon the marriage and the value of his bank accounts at the time of
his death. Thus, Barbara calculates this portion of her damages as follows:
Value of assets on February 1,1976
Value of assets on April 14, 1976 (date of marriage)
Value of assets on Louis' date of death

$51,497.45
$52,012.43
$261,996.53

Thus, at a minimum, if Barbara's interpretation of the Contract is accurate, she has a claim of
$209,984.10. While the personal representative has claims against Barbara for various items and
although Barbara requested that the Personal Representative provide an updated itemization, those
claims apparently do not exceed $20,000. Accordingly, the personal representative has not kept
sufficient assets in the estate to satisfy Barbara's claim ($189,984.10). Although not necessary for
this motion, Barbara notes that she is entitled to other properties that Louis acquired during the
marriage and that were not used by Louis or herself for living expenses.

-5-

ARGUMENT
Under Section 75-3-101, a testator has the power to leave property by will, but that power is
subject to the "restrictions and limitations" contained in the Utah Uniform Probate Code. U.C.A.
§75-3-101. In addition, while real and personal property devolve to the devisees upon the
decedent's death, that devolution is "subject to administration." Thus, under Section 75-3-901,
successors (including devisees) take ownership of property "subject to all charges incident to
administration, including the claims of creditors

" U.C.A. §75-3-901. Because creditors are

paid first under Section 75-3-901, Section 75-3-902 describes the order in which estate property
abates in order to pay creditors claims (and other claims set forth in Section 75-3-901): first,
property not devised by will, second, residuary devises, third general devises, and fourth specific
devises. U.C.A. §75-3-902.
The personal representative has a duty to "administer and distribute the estate in accordance
with the rights of claimants." UCA §75-3-703. When the personal representative distributed the
Highland Drive property to the remainder beneficiaries, he breached that duty. To remedy this
breach, Barbara asks the Court to order the beneficiaries to deed the property back to the personal
representative.
The Court should note that there is no prejudice to the remainder beneficiaries. Their
interest is a future interest that is postponed until Barbara's death. On the other hand, the potential
prejudice to Barbara is significant. Any voluntary or involuntary act by the remainder beneficiaries
could prevent Barbara from being able to reach this property to satisfy her claim and would, in any
event, significantly complicate Barbara's ability to reach this property. For example if either

-6-

remainder beneficiary was subject to a bankruptcy proceeding, Barbara would need to intervene in
that bankruptcy to protect her rights against the Highland Drive property. Further, if a remainder
beneficiary were to die, or become disabled, Barbara would have to pursue a claim against that
beneficiary's legal representative. Since both remainder beneficiaries are residents of Nevada, any
legal representative is unlikely to be subject to the jurisdiction of a Utah court.
The Court has plenary power to enter the requested Order to protect Barbara's interests.
U.C.A. §75-1-302(2) (the Court has "full power to administer justice in the maitters that come
before it"). Since the remainder beneficiaries have notice of this motion, and since they could have
taken some action to transfer or encumber legal or equitable title to their remainder interests in the
Highland Drive property, Barbara has included in the proposed deed a warranty that none of the
parties has taken any action to transfer or encumber the property.
While Barbara suggests resolving this matter by an Order requiring the beneficiaries to
execute the deed attached to the Motion as Exhibit A, there is another way that the Court can
protect her interest. Under Section 75-3-712, upon petition of an interested person, the Court will
void any transaction by the personal representative that is affected by a "substantial conflict of
interest." U.C.A. §75-3-712(1). If there is a substantial conflict of interest, the only exceptions that
allow a court not to void the transaction are either a court order authorizing the transaction in the
first instance or the interested person's informed consent. Neither of these exceptions are
applicable. Since there is no legitimate basis for this distribution other than to harm Barbara's
interests and enhance those of the remainder beneficiaries, the Court can find that the personal
representative's action was based on a desire to benefit his nieces at the expense of Louis' surviving
-7-

wife and that this constitutes a substantial conflict of interest. It also constitutes a violation of the
personal representative's duty of impartiality. C.f. U.C.A. §75-7-302(9) ("[T]he trustee shall act
impartially in investing and managing the trust assets

")

Attorney Fees and Costs
Barbara is entitled to her attorney fees and costs in rectifying this breach of trust. Hughes v.
Cajferty, 46 P.3d 233,445 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2002 UT App 105,122-24 (Utah App. 2002) (re
beneficiary's entitlement to fees for breach of duty by the trustee); Rohan v. Boseman, 6 P.3d 753
(Utah App. 2002), ^f 13 (awarding bad faith attorney fees based on the "inherent power" of the court
to do justice and equity in the matters that come before it). However, since Barbara is likely to have
an additional claim to attorney fees and costs as a result of other actions by the personal
representative, Barbara asks that the Court reserve this issue and reconsider this matter in light of
all the facts and circumstances during or after the trial scheduled for October 7,2003.
CONCLUSION
Barbara asks the Court to order the beneficiaries to execute Exhibit A to her motion. In the
alternative, Barbara asks that the Court void the May 31, 2003 Deed (Exhibit C to this
memorandum). Further, Barbara asks the Court to reserve the issue of whether or not Barbara is
entitled to her attorney fees and costs regarding this matter until trial.
Dated this^day of July, 2003.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Charles M. Bennett; Attorneys for Barbara Uzelac
H:\CMB\PLEADINGSETaUZELAC-MEMO-RETURN-PROP.MEM
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 993901690

LOUIS J. UZELAC,
Deceased.

JUDGE L.A. DEVER

This matter is currently before this Court on Barbara Uzelac's "Motion For An
Order Directing Beneficiaries To Return Estate Property To The Estate Or In The
Alternative Voiding The Deed Of Distribution." The relevant facts are as follows.
On May 31, 2003 the personal representative of decedent's estate distributed,
the remaining acres of the Highland Drive Property to his daughters, Susan Mageras
and Allyson Uzelac ("daughters"), subject to a life estate in his widow Barbara Uzelac
("Uzelac"). Uzelac's pending motion challenges the representative's distribution
claiming that it harms her rights as a creditor by reducing the estate assets to less than
the amount of her claim against the estate. As a result, Uzelac requests that the Court
either: 1)order decedent's daughters to deed the property back pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 75-3-703; or 2) void the deed as a "substantial conflict of interest" pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-712(1).
As an initial matter, issues pertaining to an interpretation of the Ante Nuptial
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Agreement and to Uzelac's "damages theory" are the proper subject of the October
7, 2003, trial or have been previously addressed in the Court's Order on the Estate's
Motion for Summary Judgment. That said, the sole issue currently before this Court is
whether a basis exists for the Court to order decedent's daughters to return the
distributed property. Upon thorough consideration of the matter, the Court finds no
basis for Uzelac's request, and therefore denies Uzelac's motion.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-107, entitled "rights of creditors," provides a mechanism
for creditors to demand that a personal representative take possession of POD
accounts if the amount of the creditor's claim is greater than the estate assets. The
provision is limited, however, to creditors who file a "written demand" with the personal
representative within " two years of the death of decedent." Significantly, Uzelac failed
to make demand upon the personal representative within the two year time limitation.
Consequently, Uzelac is unable to rely upon the code provision designed to assist her
in her claims as a creditor.
While Uzelac does not rely upon the creditors provision, she does rely upon Utah
Code Ann. § 75-3-703 and claims that the personal representative breached his duty to
administer the estate in accordance with the rights of the claimants. In relevant part,
UCA § 75-3-703 states "[a] personal representative is under a duty to settle and
distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and

In The Matter Of The Estate
Of Louis J. Uzelac

Page 3

Minute Entry

effective will and this code as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best
interest of the estate." Decedent's will grants his daughters all property in the estate
except for Uzelac's entitlements under the Ante Nuptial Agreement. See, Uzelac Will at
1. Under the terms of the Ante Nuptial Agreement Uzelac is granted the right to live in
the residence located on the estate property for her life or until such time as she moves.
See, Ante Nuptial Agreement ^ 3. Thus, the personal representative distributed the
property consistent with the terms of both the will and the agreement, and has not
breached his duty in violation of UCA § 75-3-703.
Additionally, Uzelac argues that the Court should void the distribution pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-712, by alleging that the transaction was affected by a
substantial conflict of interest. Under that provision, however, a distribution is voidable
only if there was a substantial conflict and the decedent's will did not expressly
authorize the transaction. The Court does not find evidence of a conflict of interest,
however, even if one did exist, both decedent's will and the agreement expressly
authorized the transaction. Accordingly, the transaction is not voidable for a conflict of
interest.
For the above mentioned reasons, the personal representative has not breached
his duties and the distribution is not voidable by the Court for a conflict of interest.
Uzelac's motion is denied.
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. day of September, 2003.

BY THE COURT:

LA. DEVL,x * ,„,u
DISTRICT COUl

|0^

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, to the
following, thisgft. Day of <vWV. 2003:
Charles M Bennet
Blackburn & Stoll
77 West 200 South Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
LR Curtis
Marcy C Gordon
Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar
Third Floor Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Margaret Olson
Hobbs & Olson
525 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Angela Marie Mageras & Amanda D Mageras
4200 East Lodewyck Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89121

